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DOCUMENTATION? I DON'T HAVE To
SHOW You ANY STINKIN
DOCUMENTATION!
AN EVALUATION OF THE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)
By Michael D. Slodov *
INTRODUCTION
In the course of ordinary consumer collections, a recurring issue
presents itself when the consumer tenders a written dispute
concerning a debt and makes a written request for verification of the
debt, pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1692g(b). This article addresses the question of Congress' intent
when it required debt collectors to provide verification, and whether
verification means "documentary evidence of the obligor's
indebtedness." Many experts believe,' and many courts have held,
* Member of the Bar, State of Ohio; currently an attorney with Javitch, Block
& Rathbone, LLC, practicing primarily in the areas of consumer protection
litigation; graduate of Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D.
(1990). Counsel for Amicus Curiae Ohio Creditor's Attorneys Association in
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010).
The title of this article is a reference to the 1948 movie The Treasure of the Sierra
Madre. See, e.g., The Treasure of the Sierra Madre (1948), IMDb.com,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0040897/quotes.
' See, e.g., Debt Validation - The Ultimate Weapon Against the Collection
Agencies, CREDrrINFOCENTER.coM (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.creditinfocenter.com/rebuild/debtvalidation.shtml ("What does a debt
collector need to provide as debt validation? [1] Proof that the collection company
owns the debt/or has been assigned the debt. (Bob is legally entitled to collect this
particular debt from you.) This is basic contract law. It is very difficult to get a
judgment without a direct contract between the collection agency and the original
creditor; [2] At a minimum, some account statements from the original creditor. If
you really want to get sticky, you can pin them down on the amount of the debt by
requiring complete payment history, starting with the original creditor. (How the
heck did Bob calculate this debt? What fees/interest Bob has tacked on to this debt
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that the verification requirement constitutes an entitlement to
evidentiary proof of the amount of indebtedness that is the subject of
collection. Part I of this article provides an overview of the language
of the FDCPA with a focus on the "validation of debts" requirement.
Part II articulates the case law regarding this provision. Where the
case law does not provide concrete guidance, Part III looks to the
legislative history for assistance in defining what constitutes
"validation of debt." Part IV provides an analysis of this legislative
history, setting forth two alternate interpretations of the "validation of
debts" requirement: the "confirmation of facts" and "investigation"
interpretations. Part V applies these two interpretations to the
provision. Finally, Part VI provides the conclusion that the
verification of the debt does not require documentary evidence of the
amount of the debt, nor does it require preparation or production of
any legal documents. Instead, Congress used the term "verification"
in a descriptive sense, as a method to be used to confirm that the debt
is in fact still owed by the consumer.2 Therefore, Courts have
expanded the verification requirement beyond the legislative
mandate.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF 15 U.S.C. § 1692g
The statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g, titled "validation of debts,"
provides:
(a) Notice of debt; contents
Within five days after the initial communication with a
consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a
debt collector shall, unless the following information is
contained in the initial communication or the consumer has
paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice
containing-
and how he determined these fees?) This requirement was established by the case
Fields v. Wilber Law Firm, P.C., 383 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2004); [3] Copy of the
original signed loan agreement or credit card application. (Your contract with Joe
establishing the debt between you.) However, account statements from the original
can fulfill these requirements."); see also, How To Dispute A Credit Report or
Debt, ASKDOCTORDEBT.COM, http://www.askdoctordebt.com/13611-Dispute-a-
debt .(last visited Nov. 22, 2011) ("For verification of a debt, generally it is
considered sufficient for the debt collector to provide you with a statement that the
amount being collected is the amount owed, along with any supporting
documentation or records from the creditor.").
2 See infra, nn. 55-132.
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(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty
days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of
the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be
assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt
collector in writing within the thirty-day period that
the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt
collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy
of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such
verification or judgment will be mailed to the
consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written
request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector
will provide the consumer with the name and address
of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor.
(b) If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing
within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a)3 of
this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is
disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and
address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall
cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion
thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the
debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of
the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or
judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector....
3 This article concerns the debt collector's response to a request for
verification, as opposed to the sufficiency of the debt collector's validation notice
under § 1692g(a)(4).
A Validation of Debts, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g), Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 809,
amended by Pub. L. No. 109-35 1, § 802, 120 Stat. 2006 (emphasis added). In 2006,
Congress amended the FDCPA by, among other changes, adding two sentences to
the end of subsection (b) of § 1692g. See Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(c), 120 Stat. 1966, 2006-07. Those new
sentences provide:
Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate
158 [Vol. 24:2
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The FDCPA contains no definition for the term verification. It
provides no frame of reference as to where the debt collector is to
obtain the verification.5 Likewise, it does not limit the nature of
dispute, elaborate on the distinction made for disputed portions of a
debt, or call for a dispute-centric response.
Consulting a dictionary adds little to one's understanding of
what Congress intended when it added the "verification"
requirement. Indeed, verify is defined as, "[a] confirmation of the
truth of a theory or fact . . . . A formal statement of such a
confirmation."6 Verification is defined as:
1. the act of verifying. 2. the state of being verified. 3.
evidence that establishes or confirms the accuracy or truth
of: We could find no vertfication of his fantastic claims. 4. a
formal assertion of the truth of something, as by oath,
affidavit, etc. 5. the process of research, examination, etc.
required to prove or establish authenticity or validity. 6.
Law. a short confirmatory affidavit at the end of a pleading
or petition.
Black's Law Dictionary defines verification as: "[a] formal
declaration made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a
this subchapter [i.e., the FDCPA] may continue during the 30-day
period referred to in subsection (a) of this section unless the consumer
has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of
the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address
of the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication
during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with
the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the
name and address of the original creditor.
Id.
5 See generally FTC Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50097, 50110 (Dec. 13, 1988). The FTC Staff Commentary on
this requirement states only: "Section 809(b) requires that, if the consumer disputes
the debt or requests identification of the original creditor in writing, the collector
must cease collection efforts until he verifies the debt and mails a response." Id.
6 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1422 (1973); see also WEBSTER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF THE ENGISH LANGUAGE 932 (1971) (defining
"verify" as "[T]o prove to be true; to confirm; to establish the truth, correctness, or
authenticity of."); see also RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1587 (1966) (defining
"verify" as "to prove the truth of, as by evidence or testimony; confirm;
substantiate: Events verified his prediction. 2. To ascertain the truth or correctness
of, as by examination, research, or comparison: to verify a spelling.") (emphasis
added).
7 RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1587 (1966).
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notary public, or (in some jurisdictions) under oath but not in the
presence of such an officer, whereby one swears to the truth of the
statements in the document."8 The word 'obtain' means: "to come
into possession of; get or acquire; procure, as through an effort or by
request: to obtain some information."
If the dictionary definitions resolved all doubt about what the
terms meanto going beyond the dictionary definitions would be
unnecessary. However, there is clearly more than one possible
interpretation of these terms - coimoting a confirmatory statement,
acquisition of evidence, a formal legal attestation, and, conducting
research or an examination, confirming or proving a fact - and thus,
looking beyond the definitions to the legislative history is proper."
II. CASE LAW
Case law has established varying standards regarding the
sufficiency of a debt collector's verification response. Using these
varying standards, the cases on this subject can be split into three
groups. The first group, which includes the majority of cases,
requires the debt collector to provide both confirmation in writing
that the amount in demand is what the creditor is claiming is owed
plus some documentation of the debt.12 The second group, which
includes a small minority of cases, requires that the documentation
provided to the debtor must be responsive to the nature of the dispute
raised.'3 A third group, which represents another minority view,
8 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1692 (9th ed. 2009).
9 RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY 995 (1966).
10 Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891
(2011).
" Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("The evolution of these
statutory provisions supplies further evidence that Congress intended ..... ).
12 Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) ("The computer
printouts provided to Graziano were sufficient to inform him of the amounts of his
debts, the services provided, and the dates on which the debts were incurred.");
Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir. 1999) (Gallerizzo, after
receiving assurances from NationsBank that the sums were owed, verified the debt
amounts in his January 18th letter to the plaiitiffs' counsel and forwarded a copy of
the bank's computerized summary of the Chaudhrys' loan transactions. The
summary included a running account of the debt amount, a description of every
transaction, and the date on which the transaction occurred."). See also
Homeowners Ass'n of Victoria Woods, III, Inc. v. Incarnato, 8 A.D.3d 983, 778
N.Y.S.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2004); Spears v. Brennan, 745 N.E.2d
862, 874-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
13 See Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 4:09CV00086 JHL,
2011] An Evaluation of 15 US.C. § 1692g(b) 161
requires no documentation for verification but only written
confirmation of the debt.14
A. Documentation View
Debt collectors often send documents evidencing the debt
from the creditor as a verification response. Courts have
characterized such verification responses as sufficient, but not
necessary. In Graziano v. Harrison, a debt collector sent a
validation notice advising the debtor that he owed $80 to Valley
Emergency Associates, P.A., for services rendered.' 6 In turn, the
debtor's counsel disputed the validity of the debt." "Defendant
obliged the ... request by sending a statement of account prepared by
Valley Emergency Associates, P.A., dated May 16, 1989, showing an
outstanding balance of $80.00.",18 In assessing the claimed violation
of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), the court found:
Plaintiff claims that he was not provided with adequate
verification of the debts defendant alleged were delinquent.
Defendant's affidavits, however, state that the type of
computer printouts supplied by defendant to plaintiff as
verifications are routinely accepted by insurers to verify
claims and are accepted by them as the basis for making
payments. Furthermore, defendant states in affidavits that
his clients have no "hard copy" of past billing information
which is kept in computer files. Thus, a computer printout
in one form or another is the only printed, verification
available. ... I find that the printed information provided to
2009 WL 3784236, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 10, 2009).
14 Rudek v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., No. 1:08-CV-288, 2009 WL
385804, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009) (collecting cases); Thomas v. Trott &
Trott, P.C., No. 10-13775, 2011 WL 576666, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Feb 9, 2011)
(verification consisting of name of borrower, property address, mortgagee name,
loan number, and total estimated payoff amount is sufficient to satisfy § 1692g(b));
Mabry v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 09-12154, 2010 WL 1052353, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. Feb. 24, 2010) (verification consisting of name of the borrower, property
address, origination date, loan amount, current mortgagee and address, and original
mortgagee and address is sufficient to satisfy § 1692g(b)); Burgi v. Messerli &
Kramer PA, No.: 08-419, 2008 WL 4181732 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2008).
1 Graziano v. Harrison, 763 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd and
vacated on other grounds, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).
16 Graziano, 763 F. Supp. at 1272.
17 Id.
1 Id. at 1272-73.
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plaintiff was sufficient to verify the debts at. issue.
Therefore, no violation of the Act occurred in this respect .
19
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed this portion of the
district court's order, finding "the computer printouts provided to
debtor were sufficient to inform him of the amounts of his debts, the
services provided, and the dates on which the debts were incurred." 20
Moreover, in Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo,21 debtors defaulted on a
construction loan, and the bank's attorney sent a written demand for
payment that itemized the amount owed for principal, interest, and
inspection fees, claiming the debtors were responsible for all costs,
expenses, and legal fees associated with the defaulted loan.22 The
debtors' attorney disputed the amounts claimed due and requested
verification. In reply, the bank's attorney sent two separate responses,
the first confirming the amounts "owed for principal, interest and
inspection fees" and the second confirming the amount that the bank
would accept for attorneys' fees, containing redacted legal bills as
verification of the amount owed for the attorneys' fees.2 The Court
went on to note that the bank's attorney, after receiving assurances
from the creditor that the sums were owed, verified the debt in a letter
to the debtor's attorney, which included a copy of the bank's
computerized summary of the debtor's loan transactions. 24 "The
summary included a running account of the debt amount, a
description of every transaction, and the date on which the
transaction occurred."25 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit noted that the
trial court found the verification requirement imposed "no duty on
[the bank's attorney] to have assembled supporting documentation." 26
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that the
verification response requirement does not require documentation
and that the documentation sent provided sufficient verification. The
Fourth Circuit opined:
[V]erification of a debt involves nothing more than the debt
collector confirming in writing that the amount being
'9 Id. at 1281.
20 Graziano, 950 F.2d at 113.
21 Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 394 (4th Cir. 1999).22 Id. at 400.
23 Id. at 400-0 1.
24 Id. at 400.25 Id. at 401.26 Id. at 406.
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demanded is what the creditor is claiming is owed; the debt
collector is not required to keep detailed files of the alleged
debt.... Consistent with the legislative history, verification
is only intended to "eliminate the . . . problem of debt
collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to
collect debts which the consumer has already paid . ....
There is no concomitant obligation to forward copies of
bills or other detailed evidence of the debt.2 7
The Fourth Circuit held that the actions of the bank's attorney were
sufficient to verify the debtor's debt.2 8
In a third example of the documentation cases, Ayers v.
27 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1695, 1699).
28 Id.; see also Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162,
1173-74 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting the standard of Chaudhry as "the minimum" for
verifying the debt, and approving a verification that involved "obtain[ing]
information ... about the nature and balance of the outstanding bill and provid[ing]
[plaintiffs] with documentary evidence in the form of the itemized statement.");
Maynard v. Bryan W. Cannon, P.C., 401 Fed. Appx. 389, 396-97 (10th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the section "is not intended to give a debtor a detailed accounting of
debt to be collected," but instead that "verification is intended to eliminate the
problem of debt collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to collect debts
which the consumer has already paid.") (quoting Chaudhry, 174 F.3d 394, 406);
Worch v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (E.D. Mo. 2007)
(debt collector adequately verified the debt by sending her a billing statement);
Mahon v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 1999) (debt collector
contacted creditor's office, verified nature and balance of outstanding bill, learned
that monthly statements had been sent from creditor's office to debtors for over two
years, and established that balance was still unpaid; debt collector then promptly
conveyed this information to debtors, along with itemized statement of account);
McCammon v. Bibler, Newman & Reynolds, P.A., 515 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (D. Kan.
2007) (contacting creditor to verify amount being claimed; agency did not have
additional obligation to conduct independent investigation of consumer's concerns
over whether amount claimed was correct); Madura v. Lakebridge Condo. Ass'n,
382 Fed. Appx. 862 (11th Cir. 2010) (property manager sent verification with
original notice of intent to file lien, updated the verification in later correspondence,
and sent a current statement of verification contemporaneously with filing of lien);
Ducrest v. Alco Collections, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. La. 1996) (sending the
consumer's lease and security deposit provided by the creditor sufficiently verified
the debt); Poulin v. Thomas Agency, 760 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159-61 (D. Me. 2011)
(defendant's verification response, consisting of sending a copy of the creditor's
bill, was sufficient verification of the debt); Kiggundu v. Mortg. Elec. Registration
Sys., Inc., No.'4:11-1068, 2011 WL 2606359, at *6 (S.D.Tex. June 30, 2011)
(sending note, deed and payment history "more than satisfied" verification response
requirement).
632011]
164 Loyola Consumer Law Review [Vol. 24:2
Flagstar Bank, involved a debtor who claimed the bank was
obligated to send a copy of her mortgage and promissory note as
verification of her debt. 2 9 In response, the bank sent a payment
history that included the debtor's name, the property address, the
lender's name, the loan number, the current principal balance, interest
rate, payments made, escrow balances, and late charges from January
1, 2007 (the origination date of the loan) through November 16,
2009."3o In rejecting the debtor's argument, the court held the
payment history the bank sent to the debtor was sufficient to verify
the debt.
In each of these cases, despite the observation that no
documentation was required as part of the verification response, the
courts measured the sufficiency of the verification against the
documentation of the debt sent by the debt collector. Thus, the
documentation cases support the view that a minimally sufficient
verification response may include documentation, but does not
necessarily require any documentation. The cases do not establish
what constitutes a minimally sufficient verification response in the
absence of documentation.
B. Responsive View
Some courts have held that responsive documents must
address the issue raised by the debtor. According to this view, the
sufficiency of the verification response enclosing documentation
must be responsive to the nature of the dispute raised in order to
satisfy the statute. In Lamb v. M&M Assocs., Inc.,32 the court held
that sending documentation from the original creditor was
insufficient to verify the debt because it did not meet the substance of
the debtor's dispute. The consumer received a demand for payment
29 Ayers v. Flagstar Bank, No. 10-12857, 2011 WL 2433394 (E.D. Mich. June
13, 2011).
30 Id. at *6.
31 Ayers, 2011 WL 2433394, at *6 (Plaintiff claimed the FDCPA was violated
because the verificatioii response did not include the note and mortgage). See, e.g.,
Thomas y. Trott & Trott, P.C., No. 10-13775, 2011 WL 576666, at *7 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 9, 2011) (verification consisting of name of borrower, property address,
mortgagee name, loan number, and total estimated payoff amount is sufficient to
satisfy § 1692g(b)); Mabry v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 09-12154, 2010 WL
1052353, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2010) (verification consisting of name of the
borrower, property address, origination date, loan amount, current mortgagee and
address, and original mortgagee and address is sufficient to satisfy § 1692g(b)).
32 Lamb v. M & M Assocs., No. C-3-96-463, 1998 WL 34288694 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 1, 1998).
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of $86.39, and in response, she sent the debt collector a request to
"provide . . . proof of the exact breakdown of the above stated
amount since my final bill and the amount you are demanding of me
are not the same." 33 In response, the debt collector sent a letter
demanding $88.91, and a copy of the consumer's final statement,
which listed the amount owed as $63.99, plus a monthly late fee of
$4.00.34 The court found that where "the amount set forth on that
original bill differs from the amount the debt collector is attempting
to collect, merely providing a cop of that bill does not satisfy the
obligation imposed by § 1692g(b)." o
The Court's conclusion that the bill did not suffice as
verification because it did not explain the difference between the
amount previously claimed and the amount subsequently shown to be
due, suggests that verification must not only be responsive to the
dispute raised, but also must corroborate the exact amount claimed to
be due.
Similarly, in Sasscer v. Donnelly,37 the debt collector
demanded $3,906.51 outstanding on a $20,000 auto loan note.3 ' The
consumer disputed the debt and requested verification, and in
response the debt collector sent a copy of the original note.39 When
the consumer received the note, she wrote back asserting the note
didn't prove anything,40 and requested "documented proof that the
truck was sold and for an exact amount that has been paid toward the
truck."41 The debt collector responded with a copy of the bank's
"Notice of Disposition of Collateral," listing the amount owed at the
time of sale as about $14,000, the truck's sale price of $12,200,
itemizing $1,038 for repossession, storage and disposal fees, and
stating the amount owed after the sale as $2,916.19.42 Shortly
thereafter, the debt collector filed suit against the consumer.4 3 The
consumer disputed she ever received the second response, and wrote
a third time, requesting the entire payment history, as well as "the
1 Id. at *2.
34 id.
3 Id. at *9.
36 id.
3 Sasscer v. Donnelly, No. 3:10cv464, 2011 WL 1522320 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20,
*2011).
38 Sasscer, 2011 WL 1522320, at *1.
3 Id. at *5.
40 Id. at *5-6.
41 Id. at *5.
42 d43 Id at *1.
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names of loan officers allegedly involved with granting the loan ...
."" The debt collector then sent the entire loan repayment history,
which the consumer contended showed that only $1,631.41 was in
fact owed.46 The Court commented that the debt collector's second
response "may well have been sufficient to verify the debt," but
because the Court found a genuine issue of material fact in dispute
over whether the second letter was received by the consumer, and
whether the debt collector had initiated suit before "sufficient
verification" was sent, the Court concluded summary judgment was
improper.47
In a third example, in Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,
LLC,48 Portfolio Recovery, Associates, LLC ("PRA"), sent an
"Affidavit of Ownership and Sale of Claim" in response to a
dispute.4 9 The debtor, Dunham, claimed the affidavit was insufficient
verification because it did not include: "(a) the original amount of
Dunham's debt; (b) the date on which the debt was incurred; or (c)
any evidence that PRA confirmed the debt with the original
creditor."50 PRA argued that "it was only obligated to confirm the
debt internally; PRA contends that it was not obligated to tell
Dunham when he incurred the debt, in what amount, or to what
creditor."5' The Court construed the complaint to state a plausible
claim for violating the statute.52 The Court concluded despite the
affidavit, the verification response was insufficient because "Dunham
had no way to know when or to whom he had incurred the debt and
whether the debt was still owed . . . . Simply repeating second-or
third-hand information in the debt collector's file . . . is insufficient
under the statute."5
In each of these cases, the verification response was found to be
insufficient because it was unresponsive or a discrepancy existed or it
otherwise failed to explain the amount due. Thus, these responsive
cases take the view that a minimally sufficient verification response
4 Id. at *6.
45 id
46Id. at *1.
47 Id. at *6.
48 Dunham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 4:09CV00086 JHL, 2009
WL 3784236, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 10, 2009).
49 d
50 Id.
51 id.
52 d
53 Id. at *2 (quoting Semper v. JBC Legal Group, No. C04-2240L, 2005 WL
2172377, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6,2005)).
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must corroborate the amount claimed to be due with documentation
in a manner that is responsive to a consumer's demand for
information about the debt claimed to be due.54
C. Confirmation View
The third view is that verification does not require any
documentation at all, and is accomplished by only providing a
statement confirming debt is in fact owed. In Rudek v. Frederick J.
Hanna & Assocs., P.C.,55 the debtor disputed his debt and requested
verification. In response, the debt collector sent a letter stating
"[y]our account was originally opened with CHASE BANK USA,
N.A. on April 29, 2005, and your last payment was received on
February 11, 2008. Our client has verified that the balance of
$5,192.65 to be true, correct, and still owing at this time."56 The
debtor claimed that he was entitled to documentation, but the Court
disagreed, holding that "[t]here is no concomitant obligation to
forward copies of bills or other detailed evidence of the debt."57
54 The existence of a discrepancy between the amount claimed and the
creditor's documentation more logically points to a potential violation of the
statutory prohibition against adding interest or fees which are not "expressly
authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law," 15 U.S.C. §
1692f(1); or has made a false representation as to the amount of the debt 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692e(2)(A), than it does to determining whether the documentation sent
constitutes sufficient verification of the debt.
5s Rudek v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C., No. 1:08-CV-288, 2009 WL
385804, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009).
56 Id. at *1.
Id. at *2-3. (quoting Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir.
1999)); accord. Mabry v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. 09-12154, 2010 WL
1052353 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2010); Burgi, 2008 WL 4181732, at *5 (holding "M
& K's verification, although providing a minimal amount of information to
plaintiffs, does provide the nature, status, and balance of the debt, as well as the
dates on which the account was opened and charged off, therefore providing a
range of dates for when the debts were incurred. This information is sufficient to
comply with the FDCPA."); Erickson v. Johnson, No. Civ. 05-427 (MJD/SRN),
2006 WL 453201, at *6-7 (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2006) ("At a minimum, the debt
.collector must contact the creditor and verify the nature, status, and balance of the
debt and then convey that information to the consumer.. . . Unlike the Fair Credit
Reporting Act ... which requires the creditor to 'conduct an investigation' upon
notification of the consumer's dispute of the debt, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1), the
FDCPA only requires that a debt collector 'obtain[ ] verification of the debt.'
...Verification does not require that the debt collector ascertain the legality of the
underlying credit agreement[,]... [nor does it] require the debt collector to provide
evidence to the consumer that is sufficient to conclusively establish liability for the
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The lack of uniformity on the sufficiency of the debt
collectors' verification responses as shown in the case law are not
particularly surprising in light of the absence of a definition for the
term verification. However, the decisions are troubling to debt
collectors because they may be found liable for providing an
insufficient response and, depending on which judge and jurisdiction
the case is in, there might be a different standard for sufficiency. A
closer look at the legislative history points helps to clarify what
constitutes a sufficient verification response and helps to resolve this
discrepancy.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the FDCPA, most of which has
rarely been cited in interpreting this section, is illuminating because it
shows Congress considered and ultimately rejected various
approaches to the dispute-verification process. The House of
Representatives began crafting debt collection legislation in 1975.
There are indications that much of the language appearing in the
FDCPA was borrowed from existing state law and model
legislation.59 In its first draft, the House of Representatives imposed a
debt in a court action.").
"
8See H.R. 10191, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975); see also H.R. 11961, 94th
Cong. (1976); Debt Collection Practices Act of 1976: Hearings on H.R. 11969
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Currency & Housing, 94th Cong. (March &
April 1976) [hereinafter "Hearings on H.R. 11969"]; H.R. 13720, 94th Cong.
(1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1202 (1976); H.R. 29, 95th Cong. (1977); Debt
Collection Practices Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the House Comm. on
Banking, Currency & Housing, 95th Cong. (March 1977); H.R. 5294, 95th Cong.
(1977); H.R. REP. NO. 95-131 (1977); S. 656, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 918, 95th
Cong. (1977); S. 1130, 95th Cong. (1977); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act:
Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, & H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong.
(May 12-13, 1977); 123 CONG. REC. H10137-11324 (Apr. 4, 1977; Sept. 8, 1977).
9 See S. Comm. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, MARKUP ON DEBT
COLLECTION LEGISLATION 61 (June 30, 1977) (statement of Mr. Taffer, referring to
the general prohibitions in Sections 806, 807): "[The language in the Act] is lifted
from the West Virginia debt collection law. It is also similar in concept to 14 other
state laws which set forth general prohibitions like this."); id. at 64 (statement of
Senator Riegle): "[A]s was pointed out by counsel, this is patterned after what are
thought to be some of the best state laws where states have moved in to deal with
these problems. There are fourteen states who now have these general prohibitions.
One of them is the state of New Mexico. One is my own home state of Michigan.
This is not a new invention."); William Richard Carroll, Debt Collection Practices:
The Need for Comprehensive Legislation, 15 DUQ. L. REV. 97, 116 (1976);
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substantial initial recordkeeping and disclosure requirement on debt
collectors.60 Section 810 of H.R. 10191, titled Inspection, which
Hearings on H.R. 11969, supra note 58, at 144-55, 183-84 (statement of John W.
Johnson, Model Legislation Exhibits B & C); id. at 230-34 (statement of Jay I.
Ashman); id at 237-41 (statement of Joel Weisberg); id. at 252-56 (statement of
Richard Gross); id at 264-65 (statement of Thomas Raleigh); id. at 274-75
(statement of Lewis Goldfarb).
See H.R. 10191, §§ 806, 809, 810, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975); H.R. 10191, §
806, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975) provided:
A debt collector shall keep at each of his offices the following
information for at least two years after the last activity with respect to
the alleged debt by such debt collector:
(1) Account cards for each collection action in excess of $100
being processed at such office. Such account card shall bear the
following information:
(A) name, address, and home phone number (if the debt
collector obtains the home phone number) of the consumer
and all individuals contacted concerning the alleged debt
including, without limitation, his employer and his
relatives;
(B) dates and copies of all correspondence mailed to the
consumer, his employer or his family;
(C) dates and times of each telephone call to the consumer,
his employer, or his family; the name of employee who
made such call and name of individual to whom such
employee spoke;
(D) name and address of the original creditor, date account
opened with the debt collector, and the total alleged debt on
the date received;
(E) date of each collection on such account, and
(F) all additional charges, such as court costs and attorneys
fees. Such charges must be documented and copies of the
documents related thereto shall be kept in the original
papers file.
(2) The original papers file for each collection account in excess
of $100 being processed at such office shall contain the
following:
(A) copies of all correspondence concerning the alleged
debt between the debt collector and the creditor received by
the debt collector;
(B) copies of all correspondence concerning the alleged
debt between the debt collector and the consumer, the
consumer's employer, the consumer's family and the
consumer's attorney;
(C) instruction letters from the consumer on disbursement
of funds among multiple creditors;
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appears comparable in its purpose to U.S.C. section 1692g, provides:
(a) Each debt collector shall, upon request and proper
identification of any consumer:
(1) allow the consumer to inspect all papers or copies
in its possession which bear the signature of the
consumer; ...
(2) allow the consumer to inspect all ledgers and
similar accountings concerning the alleged debt which
(D) copies of all documents, suits, judgments, etc.,
concerning the alleged debt;
(E) copies of all correspondence concerning the alleged
debt between the debt collector and the debt collector's
attorney.
(3) When the account is paid in full, the account card and original
papers file relating thereto shall be clearly and boldly marked
'PAID' and such records shall be kept in a separate file for a
period of 12 months from the date of full payment.
H.R. 10191, § 809, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975) provided:
Each debt collector (at the time of the initial collection effort or upon
the request of the consumer) shall disclose clearly and accurately, in
accordance with the regulations of the Commission, to each consumer
from whom the debt collector is attempting to collect an alleged debt,
the following:
(1) the name, address and telephone number of the debt collector
(and of the creditor by whom he was engaged to collect the
alleged debt):
(2) The nature of the relationship between the debt collector and
the creditor;
(3) A brief identification of the alleged debt;
(4) The date the alleged debt was incurred and the name of the
original creditor;
(5) The number and amount of payments credited against the
alleged debt;
(6) The outstanding balance of the alleged debt, including the
number and amount of payments scheduled to repay the
indebtedness;
(7) The default, delinqueqcy, or similar charges payable in the
event of late payments;
(8) That the consumer may request to inspect certain documents
relating to the alleged debt pursuant to section 810 of this title;
and
(9) Any other information which the Commission deems
appropriate.
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are in the possession of the debt collector;
(3) clearly and accurately disclose to the consumer the
nature, substance, and sources of all information in its
possession concerning the alleged debt;
(4) with respect to subsection (a), the consumer may
make copies and take notes during the inspection ...
61
H.R. 11969, a 1976 version of the legislation, similarly
required the debt collector to provide at the consumer's request:
The name, address, and telephone number of such debt
collector. The name, address, and telephone number of the
original creditor; the dates of and parties to any sale,
referral, assignment, or other transfer of such debt; and the
unpaid amount of such debt on such dates; [t]he date credit
was extended creating such debt, and the date. and amount
of any collection; [a]ny additional charge, including any
court cost, attorney's fee, or late payment charge; [a]
summary of any instruction from such Consumer on the
disbursement of funds among creditors; Any document
signed by such consumer concerning his obligation to repay
such debt, and any ledger or similar accounting of such
debt."62
In hearings on H.R. 11969, Mr. Spafford, President of the
Associated Credit Bureaus, testified that these recordkeeping and
disclosure requirements were ill-conceived, burdensome, and had the
potential to be abused. In their stead, he suggested an alternative:
Mr. Chairman, an ethical collector doesn't want to pursue
an improper claim, nor does he want to waste time and
money chasing the wrong person. Our members do not
want these kinds of accounts for collection and legitimate
creditors have no desire to press for collection of these
accounts.
Therefore, we suggest that in lieu of the current provisions
in Sections -808 and 810 a meaningful mechanism be
substituted to trigger the rights of an aggrieved consumer.
6' H.R. 10191, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975).
62 H.R. 11969, § 810(a)(1)(A)-(F), 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1976).
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Creditors should be required to certify to the collector in a
one time contract [sic] that accounts turned over for
collection are legitimate and that support data for the debt
is available ....
The law should give the misidentified consumer an
opportunity to challenge the account with a reasonable
period of time, but not give the 'professional debtor' an
additional tool to escape payment. We propose that a
collector be required to send a form to a debtor who
challenges an account and give him an opportunity to say -
'it isn't me.' The rights would be triggered and the creditor
would have to produce evidence of the debt before
proceeding.63
Evidence and testimony offered in the House of
Representatives during the hearings on H.R. 11969 and H.R.29, the
successive bill introduced in the 95t Congress, highlighted some of
the unscrupulous practices used by certain debt collectors, as well as
the varying nature of disputes.6 The bulk of testimony showed that
6 Hearings on HR. 11969, supra note 58; see also id at 118-19 (statement by
Mr. Annunzio) ("If the subcommittee were to rewrite ... [these] sections along the
lines suggested in your testimony ... would your association support the bill?); id.
(statement by Mr.Wylie) (discussing the FCRA & FCBA dispute "triggering"
process); id. at 124-25 (statement by Mr. Grassley discussing the same).
6 Hearings on H.R. 11969, supra note 58 (testimony of James Clark); id. at
62-91 (testimony of Larry Goldstein) (billed for a newspaper subscription not
ordered); id. (testimony of Frank Ennis) (collection agency loses payment); id.
(testimony of Carolyn Fox) (dunned for a debt owed by Claire E. Fox); id.
(testimony of Tom Eichner) (intrusive calls after paying in full); id (testimony of
Mary Evans) (roommate agreed to handle rent); id. (testimony of Larry Bagley)
(calls regarding unpaid promissory note); Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977:
Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the House Comm. on Banking, Currency & Housing,
95th Cong. 22-91, 69-70 (March 1977) (testimony of William R. Mann, Hugh
Wilson):
Mr. Vento: ... [O]ne of the problems you mentioned, the nature of
the accounts that you receive to collect are such that they are very often
disputed.. . . [W]hat percentage of accounts are disputed?
Mr. Mann: With rental accounts, you are going to find 50 percent or
more disputed. Animal hospital accounts, the veterinarian charged too
much and so forth, and I would say they are not disputed as not owing,
but they are disputed in the amount that they owe. Rental accounts
many times are disputed in owing anything whatsoever, because they
put up a security deposit first. . . . -
Mr. Wilson: ... I know that there were disputed accounts, but,
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the problem of debt invalidity was primarily one relating to creditor
disputes, as opposed to improper add-on fees.6 5 Examples included:
bills for merchandise they never ordered, interest claimed due on a
non-interest bearing note lease obligations subject to an oral
modification defense, billing for the wrong products that were
shipped, memberships that were not ordered, and even some
instances in which the consumer had no legal obligation to pay.66
Testimony from Carolyn Fox regarding her experience with debt
collectors demanding payment for a debt owed by Claire E. Fox6 7
highlighted the procedures debt collectors were using at the time to
verify the information they received from the creditor.6 8 It was found
that debt collectors first sent a notice of the debt to the address
identified in the creditor's record. The notice contained a check box
which directed the recipient to return the notice if it reached the
addressee in error.6 9 The only way for the noticed party to dispute the
regardless of the situation involved in a disputed account, it was not
within our realm to handle. Our job was to collect the money. It may
have been disputed but that wasn't our problem ....
Mr. Vento: In your judgment, do you think it would be worthwhile
or workable in cases where there is a disputed debt, for that collection
agency to be barred from collection activity when there is a dispute
about a debt, a legitimate dispute? ...
Mr. Mann: You're talking about two different disputes now, sir. In
one dispute the party states that they don't owe that much money. They
would explain it to me, and then if I could verify the fact, that they had
receipts, I would reduce the debt to that amount, to whatever it was.
The other one was a type of dispute where the debtor would say, "I
don't owe it." I don't believe that a debt collection agency should be
the one to determine whether the debtor owes it or not. I do believe that
the courts and the customer and the debtor should resolve whether the
debtor owes the money or not, and not a collection agency.
See also id. at 283 (statement of Joseph M. Garber); id. at 302 (statement of
Michael M. Goldberg).
65 Hearings on H.R. 11969, supra note 58; see also note 64 (describing witness
testimony).
66 Id.; see also Debt Collection Practices Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 29
Before the House Comm. on Banking, Currency & Housing, 95th Cong. (1977).
67 Hearings on H.R. 11969, supra note 58, at 71.
61 Id. at 199-210.
69 Id. at 200-01:
Mr. Wylie. What I am getting at is how does a person who did not
contract for the debt in the first instance avoid what happened to Ms.
Fox?
Mr. Selbo. We do have on the letter that we send out, Mr. Wylie, a
dispute or anything else wrong, to just reverse the action, send it back to
us and we would reverse the action back to the client.
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debt is to send that notice back with her dispute written on it. The
creditor has no other initial check to determine that they have the
correct debtor.
The recordkeeping and disclosure requirements of H.R. 11969
were omitted from subsequent drafts of the legislation, and in their
stead, "certification" requirements emerged.7 o Section 808(4) of H.R.
13720 provided:
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within
the thirty-day period that the debt is disputed, the debt
collector shall cease collection of the debt until such debt
collector obtains certification of the validity of the debt
from the creditor and a copy of such certification is mailed
to the consumer by the debt collector.71
The report accompanying H.R. 13720 summarized the
certification requirement of Section 808 as requiring four elements to
achieve compliance: obtaining a statement from the creditor
Mr. Wylie. You say you have a place on the notification that you can
check?
Mr. Selbo. Right. If there's a dispute of any type, to return it to us
immediately and contact us, and that is in the very first notice that goes
out. We do not contact them. A notice goes first.
Mr. Wylie. You say you send out a notice in writing as your first
official notice?
Mr. Selbo. Right; that so and so client has given us an amount.of
blank in your name, and we are sending this for address verification. If
the address is correct, it stays and we assume the individual got the letter
and the notice; if they return it, it comes back and says that he does not
live there or they have gone, and they get information that way, and then
we start looking and start searching form the individual....
Mr. Wylie. What would you think about a bill similar to the.. .Fair
Credit Billing Act, Which would require written notice initially, and then
the Treasury's advice if there is an indication that there was some dispute
as to the debt?
Mr. Selbo. We do this now, Mr. Wylie. We send this notice out on
every account that we process.
Mr. Wylie. So you would not find that objectionable?
Mr. Selob. Not I.
Mr. Wylie. What about you, Ms. Avant?
Ms. Avant. We do the same thing. When we get an account, we send
out.. .[a first letter] stating that we do have the account in the office and
state the client that we are working for, and they have several days to
contact us.
70 See H.R. 13720, 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1976).
71 id
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containing an itemization of the debt, the name of the consumer, that
the debt has not been paid, and that the "creditor (to whom the debt
was originally owed) in consideration of the consumer's debt has
either delivered a merchantable product or properly rendered a
,,72service.
The certification requirements appeared in both subsequent
versions of the House Bill, H.R. 29 and H.R. 5294.73 Objecting to
certain aspects of the approach taken in H.R. 29, Mr. Garber,
president of Credit Bureau of Cincinnati, Inc., testified that the
verification response requirement was redundant in that it mirrored
the consumer's rights under the Fair Credit Billing Act, and that
requiring the collector to provide the name and address of the creditor
"to whom the debt was originally owed as it appeared in the original
sales contract or bill of sale" 74 was overly burdensome:
There are two specific parts of . . . section [808] that
concern me. It is my understanding that the Fair Credit
Billing Act75 was enacted for this very purpose. That is, to
allow the consumer time after receiving his statement of
account from his creditor to dispute the validity of that
particular debt ....
It seems unnecessary and certainly imposes a burden on the
debt collector to go through the same exercise with the
debtor once again. In the few instances where a debt
H.R. REP. No. 94-1202, at 4 (1976).
H.R. 29, 95th Cong. § 808(b) (1977) ("If the consumer notifies the debt
collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) (3) that
the debt is disputed, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt until such
debt collector obtains certification of the validity of the debt from the creditor and a
copy of such certification is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.")
(emphasis added); H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. § 808(b) (1977) ("If the consumer
notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in
subsection (a) (3) that the debt is disputed, the debt collector shall cease collection
of the debt until such debt collector obtains certification of the validity of the debt
from the creditor and a copy of such certification is mailed to the consumer by the
debt collector. The debt collector shall provide, along with such certification, the
name and address of the creditor to whom the debt was originally owed as it
appeared in the original sales contract or bill of sale and the name of the creditor to
whom the debt is currently owed, or if the debt did not arise out of a transaction
involving a sales contract or bill of sale, the name and address of the creditor.")
(emphasis added).
4 H.R. 29, 95th Cong. § 808(a)(2) (1977).
7 Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 306, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974)
(adding 15 U.S.C. § 1666).
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collector may have been provided a wrong name of a
debtor, and the debtor so informs the bill collector, the
collector will in turn clarify that from the creditor . . . .
Therefore, I would contend that there is no need in
requiring a collector to notify the debtor of the right to
dispute the account, as such has already been provided the
debtor under the Fair Credit Billing Act.
My next point with respect to this validation of debt section
has to do with the type of information to be provided the
debtor ....
[M]any of the bills that we handle reflect purchases made
not in one location but in many locations. Consider your
typical oil company bill. One such bill may contain charges
for gas in one-half dozen stations in one or many cities or
States .... Obtaining all of this information would be a
very costly process and would provide no essential profit to
the consumer involved.
After the hearings on H.R. 29, additional revisions were made
to Section 808 in executive session, and when the section appeared in
H.R. 5294, the legislation had omitted the name and address
requirement for each creditor which had been found in H.R. 29, §
808(a)(2). However, the certification requirement that emerged in
H.R. 13720 provided, as both H.R. 29 and H.R. 5294 had, that "the
debt collector shall cease collection of the debt until such debt
collector obtains certification of the validity of the debt from the
76Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the H. Comm. on
Banking, Fin, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 283 (1977) (statement of Mr. Garber,
President, Credit Bureau of Cincinnati, Inc.); see also id. at 247-49 (American
Collectors Association, Inc. Position Paper No. 4) (echoing these sentiments); id. at
146 (commentary of Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.) (indicating their support for
the approach and its improvements over H.R. 11969); see also Hearings on S. 656,
S. 918, S. 1130, and HR. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 733 (1977) (statement
of the National Consumer League) (characterizing S. 918 § 809's validation
requirement as "build[ing] into the debt collection process the essential philosophy
of the Fair Credit Billing Act which provides that debtors must be given full
opportunity to dispute accounts on the merits . . . "); see also id. at 746 (statement
of the Consumer Bankers Association) ("[w]e believe that a useful definition [for
'certification'] would focus on the creditor's good faith efforts to verify the
disputed debt. This would be analogous to the creditor's reinvestigation role under
§611 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.").
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creditor.. . . " H.R. 5294 cleared the House by one vote. 78
Next, the Senate considered H.R. 5294 along with three
competing Senate versions: S. 656, S. 918 and S. 1130. Both S. 656
and S. 918 contained a nearly identical certification requirement as
contained in H.R. 5294 § 808(b). 79 A side-by-side comparison of the
subdivisions of H.R. 5294 §808(a), S. 656 §808(a) and S. 918§809(a) reveals that the required content of the validation notice to
the consumer was originally intended to mirror and work in tandem
with 1692g(b)'s dispute-triggering mechanism regarding certification
of the validity of a debt. H.R. 5294 §808(a)(3) and (a)(4) and S. 918
§809(a)(3) and (4) required the debt collector to send notice that
included the following information:
H.R. 5294 §808 (a)(3): A statement that unless the
consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice,
disputes the validity of the debt, the debt will be assumed as
valid by the debt collector.
S. 918 §809(a)(3): A statement that unless the consumer,
within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof the debt will be
assumed as valid by the debt collector.
H.R. 5294 §808 (a)(4): A statement that if the consumer
notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day
n H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. § 808(b) (1977); H.R. 29, 95th Cong. § 808(b)
(1977).
7 123 CONG. REC. H10137-11324, 10255 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1977); 123 CONG.
REC. H28109, H28112 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1977) (statement of Mr. Bauman). The
primary objection to H.R. 5294 was the inclusion of criminal penalties for FDCPA
violations. 123 CONG. REC. H28109, H281 11 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1977) (statement of
Mr. Annunzio).
' Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. 625, 637, 645, 658-59 (1977), reprinting S. 656, 95th Cong. § 808(b) (1977)
("If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period
that the debt is disputed, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt until
such debt collector obtains certification of the validity of the disputed portion of the
debt or a copy of a judgment from the creditor and a copy of such certification is
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector."); S. 918, 95th Cong. § 809(b) (1977)
("If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period
that the debt is disputed, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt until
such debt collector obtains certification of the validity of the disputed portion of the
debt or a copy of a judgment from the creditor and a copy of such certification is
mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.").
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period that the debt is disputed, the debt collector shall
cease collection of the debt until such debt collector obtains
certfication of the validity of the debt from the creditor and
a copy of such certification is mailed to the consumer by
the debt collector, and a statement that, along with such
certfication, the debt collector shall provide the name and
address of the creditor.
S. 918 §809(a)(4): A statement that if the consumer notifies
the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period
that the debt is disputed, the debt collector shall cease
collection of the debt until such debt collector obtains
certication of the validity of the debt or a copy of a
judgment from the creditor and a copy of such certification
or judgment is mailed to the consumer by the debt
collector.o
Congressman Chalmers Wylie, ranking minority member of
the House Consumer Affairs Committee, remarked that the
legislation before the Senate involved a delicate balance of
competing interests:
H.R. 5294 defines the limit to which collectors may press
for the collection of an overdue account. Any legislation of
this kind calls for a balancing of competing interests, and
so it is with the debt collection business.
I think a fair compromise has been struck between the
concepts of privacy, which was my concern at the outset,
and the reason for part of my skepticism, the right to be left
alone, and the sanctity of a contract, and the subsequent
breach of that contract by a failure to pay.
In balancing those interests, I think our legislation does not
attempt to insulate the consumer debtor against the
unpleasantness of a reminder that he has not lived up to his
word to pay a just debt. We must be mindful that collection
of an overdue account is not a diplomatic exchange
80 Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. at 658-59, 702-03 (emphasis added). It did not escape the attention of the
drafters that "or any portion thereof" did not appear in § 809(a)(4), and it was
subsequently added prior to consideration on the floor of the Senate. 123 CONG.
REc. S27833, S27834 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1977).
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overflowing with the trimmings of protocol.
But in the broad sense, this bill gives full recognition to the
important role, I think, that an ethical debt collector plays
in our credit-oriented society.
It gives the collector the absolute right, for example, to an
initial contact with the debtor. It gives the collector the
absolute right to skip trace. It gives the collector the
absolute right to demand a written notice from the debtor in
the case of a disputed debt. And finally, the collector has
the right to continue to communicate with the debtor until
the debtor notifies him in writing to cease
communications.81
The bulk of the Senate Hearing consisted of statements made
by stakeholders, without much in the way of anecdotal storytelling or
discussion of specific provisions of the bill. In the markup session,
the certification requirement was addressed, and it was changed to
refer instead to verification as part of what was referred to as several
technical, non-controversial amendmeits. 82
When the bill was read on the floor of the Senate, Section
809(b) provided "the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt,
or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains
verification of the debt, or a copy of a judgment, or the name and
address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or
judgment or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to
the consumer by the debt collector." 83 The Senate Report explained
" Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. 45 (1977); see also id. at 96-97 (statement of Robert J. Hobbs, Staff
Attorney, National Consumer Law Center) (characterizing the dispute mechanism
as facilitating the ability of a consumer to "voicing consumer dissatisfaction"
claims for goods or services purchased); id. at 252-566, 441-47 (statement of Allen
Finkel, General Counsel, Office of Consumer Affairs, Dep't of Health, Education
& Welfare) (providing a National Survey of the Complaint-Handling Procedures
used by Consumers and describing parts of the response function to consumer
complaints, including investigations and formulation of a response).
2 S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, MARKUP ON DEBT
COLLECTION LEGISLATION 72-74 (July 26, 1977) ("Mr. Taffer: ... With regard to
certification of debts under that section, we substitute the word 'verification' for
'certification,' so there is no confusion as to whether any sort of legal document is
involved.).
" 123 CONG. REC. S27383, S27384 (Aug. 5, 1977).
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the purpose of the verification requirement:
Another significant feature of this legislation is its
provision requiring the validation of debts. After initially
contacting a.consumer, a debt collector must send him or
her written notice stating the name of the creditor and the
amount owed. If the consumer disputes the validity of the
debt within 30 days, the debt collector must cease
collection until he sends the consumer verification.
This provision will eliminate the recurring problem of debt
collectors dunning the wrong person or attempting to
collect debts which the consumer has already paid. Since
the current practice of most debt collectors is to send
similar information to consumers, this provision will not
result in additional expense or paperwork. 84
Courts have found that in the face of a dispute, the debt
collector has the option to either not verify the debt at all and cease
collection or to provide verification of the debt and. resume
collection:
Section 1692g(b) thus gives debt collectors two options
when they receive requests for validation. They may
provide the requested validations and continue their debt
collecting activities, or they may cease all collection
activities . . . . The statute wisely anticipates that not all
debts can or will be verified. After all, in the real world,
creditors and debt collectors make mistakes, and sometimes
initiate collection activities against persons who do not owe
a debt. When a collection agency cannot verify a debt, the
statute allows the debt collector to cease all collection
activities at that point without incurring any liability for the
mistake..
The foregoing demonstrates that Congress considered and
ultimately rejected the notion that the verification process required
debt collectors to obtain and produce volumes of paper itemizing the
debt, and obtain a certification of validity from the creditor. 86
* S. REP. No. 95-382 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
85 Jang v. A.M. Miller and Assocs., 122 F.3d 480,483 (7th Cir. 1997).
86 H.R. 10191, § 809, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975); H.R. 11969, §810(a)(1)(A)-
(F), 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1976); H.R. 5294, 95th Cong. § 808(b).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
What is striking about the revision made in the markup
session to section 809(b) is that the substitution. of verification instead
of certification went well beyond one word; rather, instead of
requiring a debt collector to "obtain[ ] certification of the validity of
the debt from the creditor," the revision merely required a debt
collector to "obtain[ ] verification of the debt."87 Taffer's reference to
the change as clarifying that the statute does not require "any sort of
legal document" 8 8 could be read as meaning several things. To the
extent "certification" could have been interpreted as a legal
attestation, likewise "verification" connotes a legal attestation but
also potentially connotes evidence, proof, and other "legal"
documents.
If the Senate viewed the verification requirement as
equivalent to the House's interpretation of the certification
requirement, the expectation is that the Senate Report would have
reiterated the House Report's sentiment concerning what constituted
certification. Yet when the markup transcript and the Senate Report
are read in light of the House Report's. suggestion regarding how to
comply with the "certification" requirement, it appears that the
Senate intended to omit any implication that the verification
requirement necessitated the debt collector to obtain any evidence,
proof, and other "legal" documents from the creditor.89
Specific language of the Fair Credit Billing Act ("FCBA")
supports the conclusion that verification does not promote an
investigatory or evidence-gathering mandate. 90 Comparing the
verification requirement of section 809 with the error resolution
provision of the FCBA, 15 U.S.C. § 1666, which was enacted in
81 Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cont at 658-59, 702-03; 123 CONG. REC. S27383, S27384 (Aug. 5, 1977).
S. Comm. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, MARKUP ON DEBT
COLLECTION LEGISLATION 72-74 (July 26, 1977)
89 Compare S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, MARKUP ON
DEBT COLLECTION LEGISLATION 72-74 (July 26, 1977) (statement of Mr. Taffer)
and id. at 3 3-34 (Statement of Senator Schmitt) ("[T]he Fair Credit Billing Act now
protects consumers against such concerns as erroneous identification of a debtor in
a disputed account. The disputed resolution procedure now in effect under that
federal statute and the attendant penalty for violation greatly reduces the possibility
that a consumer debtor will be erroneously done by a creditor collecting his own
account."), with H.R. REP. No. 94-1202, at 4 (1976) and S. REP. No. 95-382
(1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695.
9 15 U.S.C. § 1666, Pub. L. 93-495, Title III, § 306, Oct. 28, 1974 (1974).
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1974, shows both similarities and differences. Under 15 U.S.C. §
1666, when the creditor received a billing error notice, the creditor
was required to cease "taking any action to collect the amount, or any
part thereof" within thirty days, and to either:
(i) make appropriate corrections in the account of the
obligor, including the crediting of any finance charges on
amounts erroneously billed, and transmit to the obligor a
notification of such corrections and the creditor's
explanation of any change in the amount indicated by the
obligor under paragraph (2) and, if any such change is
made and the obligor so requests, copies of documentary
evidence of the obligor's indebtedness; or
(ii) send a written explanation or clarification to the
obligor, after having conducted an investigation, setting
forth to the extent applicable the reasons why the creditor
believes the account of the obligor was correctly shown in
the statement, and, upon request of the obligor, provide
copies of documentary evidence of the obligor's
indebtedness. In the case, of a billing error where the
obligor alleges that the creditor's billing statement reflects
goods not delivered to the obligor or his designee in
accordance with the agreement made at the time of the
transaction, a creditor may not construe such amount to be
correctly shown unless he determines that such goods were
actually delivered, mailed, or otherwise sent to the obligor
and provides the obligor *with a statement of such
determination.
Through this provision, Congress imposed a duty on creditors
to address errors, to conduct an investigation, and to provide on
request, "documentary evidence of the obligor's indebtedness." In
light of the statutory construction maxim, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, the absence of such a requirement from section 809 supports
the inference that Congress did not intend to impose such an
obligation on debt collectors. 9 3
Further, when section 809 is read in light of the Senate
Report, the verification requirement was clearly intended to protect
only the person who had already paid a debt and "the wrong
91 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a)(3)(B)(i), (ii) (emphasis added).
92 T.
93 Tenn. Valley Auth. Y. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978).
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person," 94 that is, a misidentified debtor. Whatever "verification"
might potentially mean, it is at least apparent that the Senate
understood that verification would not exist for either person; it was
only in the absence of verification that collection efforts would
necessarily cease.95
Despite the statement appearing in the Senate Report and the
foregoing arguments against a documentary evidence requirement,
there are indications in the text of section 1692g(a) that the
verification requirement under section 1692g(b) was intended to
protect against more than collection efforts directed only at persons
who already paid or the wrong person. There are no limits for
consumer disputes and no qualifications of the duty to provide
verification of the debt in section 1692g(b). Both sections
1692g(a)(3) and (a)(4) state that the debt collector must notify the
consumer that he has the right to "dispute[ ] the validity of the debt,
or any portion thereof. . . " and to provide notice that "that the debt,
or any portion thereof, is disputed. ... "A "dispute" is defined as "to
argue against; call into question: to dispute a proposal."96 "Valid" is
defined as "1. Well-grounded; sound; supportable: a. valid objection .
... 3. Legally sound and effective; incontestable; binding: a valid
title."97 When the change was made to subdivisions (a) and (b) in the
markup, and the word verification was substituted for the word
certification, the Senate left other references in the statute to the
(in)validity of a debt intact. Comparing section 1692g(a) with
section 1692g(a)(4), it is only in connection with the latter
subdivision that Congress expressly provided that a debt collector
was obligated to obtain verification, and there is no mention of any
obligation to obtain verification relating to a debt with disputed
validity in section 1692g(a)(3). 99
Further, neither section 1692g(a)(4) nor section 1692gqo
mentions validity of the debt. Instead, they refer to disputed debts.
Courts have struggled to reconcile this illogical disparity, primarily
focusing on the issue of whether a dispute under section 1692g(a)(3)
9 S. REP. No. 95-382 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699.
9 Section 1692g(b) provides that collection efforts are to cease "until the debt
collector obtains verification. . . and a copy of such verification ... is mailed to the
consumer by the debt collector."
96 RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 415 (1966).
9 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1414 (1973); RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY 1578 (1966).
9' 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3) and (c).
9 In re Sanchez, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
00 Id. at 1032 (" . . . the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed. . .
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must be made in writing.101 The courts have consistently found that
an oral dispute under section 1692g(a)(3) does not trigger a
verification response'02 because subsection (b) clearly provides that
verification is required only regarding disputes made in writing.1os
The provisions of section 1692g(a)(3), (4), and (5), when read in light
of subsection 1692g(b), suggest that Congress intended to provide a
mechanism for consumers to voice a wide variety of disputes,
including, but not limited to, oral disputes and those directed at the
validity of a debt.'" While the prevailing view is that oral disputes
101 Compare Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991)
("Adopting Graziano's reading of the statute would thus create a situation in which,
upon the debtor's non-written dispute, the debt collector would be without any
statutory ground for assuming that the debt was valid, but nevertheless would not
be required to verify the debt or to advise the debtor of the identity of the original
creditor and would be permitted to continue debt collection efforts. We see no
reason to attribute to Congress an intent to create so incoherent a system."), with
Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2005) ("the
plain meaning of subsection (a)(3) does not lead to absurd results because an oral
dispute triggers multiple statutory protections. We thus disagree with the Third
Circuit in Graziano, which found it absurd that an oral dispute could rebut the
presumption of validity but not trigger the verification requirement under §
1692§(a)(4), or the identification requirement under § 1692g(a)(5).").
1 2 Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1081-82 (finding "an oral dispute triggers multiple
statutory protections . . . . Oral dispute of a debt precludes the debt collector from
communicating the debtor's credit information to others without including the fact
that the debt is in dispute."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) (requiring a debt
collector "to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed"); Brady v. Credit
Recovery Co., 160 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 1998) (Congress did not impose a writing
requirement under section 1692e(8), as it did under section 1692g(b), rejecting the
argument that a dispute must be made in writing to trigger the duty to report a debt
as disputed under 1692e(8)); 15 U.S.C. § 1692h (stating if a consumer owes
multiple debts and makes a payment, the debt collector is prohibited from applying
such payment to a debt which is in dispute). Moreover, a debtor's oral notification
to a debt collector entitles a debtor to relief under § 1692c(a)(1), which bars
communication with a debtor at "a time or place known or which should be known
to be inconvenient to the consumer." 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1).
'os In re Sanchez, 173 F.Supp.2d at 1034.
'0 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. By requiring the debt collector to provide the debtor
a verification of a judgment, this statute implicates that a judgment for a given debt
may already be in place. By allowing a debtor to obtain a copy of a judgment from
court records, the statute supports the implication arising from the omission of
"from the creditor" language in that verification can be obtained from any source.
Id. Section 1692g(a)(5) allows for a change in ownership of the obligation by
requiring the debt collector to notify the consumer that they have the right, upon
written request, to "the name and address of the original creditor, if different from
the current creditor." Id. 1692g(b) provides that when a consumer makes a written
An Evaluation of 15 US.C. § 1692g(b)
serve a different purpose, 05 under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) and § 1692h
scant attention has been paid to the fact that a dispute under section
1692g(a)(3) must be concerning "the validity" of a debt, "or any
portion thereof," while sections 1692g(a)(4), 1692e(8), and 1692h do
not mention disputed validity, instead referring to disputed debts. 0 6
Ultimately, the object of this exercise is to divine legislative
intent. What becomes apparent from the foregoing textual analysis is
that verification of the debt is not a legal "certification of the validity
of the debt" or "documentary evidence of the obligor's
indebtedness." Furthermore, verification does not have to be obtained
from the creditor. Thus, having ruled out verification as connoting a
legal attestation or evidence, it must be understood to require either a
"confirmation of the truth of a theory or fact" or "the process of
research, examination, etc. required to prove or establish authenticity
or validity." These two theories, the "confirmation of the facts" and
"investigation" interpretations, will be discussed in detail below.
V. APPLICATION OF THE "CONFIRMATION OF FACTS" AND
THE "INVESTIGATION" INTERPRETATIONS.
In deciding between these two interpretations, it would make
request for the name and address of the original creditor, collection must cease
"until the debt collector obtains ... the name and address of the original creditor,
and a copy of such . . . name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the
consumer by the debt collector." Id The statute again does not specify from where
that information is obtained.
105 Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1081-82.
106 The simplest explanation for this disparity would be that the use of
"disputed" in § 1692g(b) instead of "disputed validity" does not signal anything but
a shorthand reference to the same concept, as a dispute going to validity is a
subclass of general classification of disputes. If that were correct, then the reference
in subsection (b), as well as in § 1692e(8) and § 1692h, to a disputed debt would
include disputed validity under § 1692g(a)(3), a disputed portion, and all other
disputes under § 1692g(a)(4). If, however, "disputed validity" was intended to
connote a distinct species of disputes, the logic for explaining the differences in §
1692g(a)(3) and (4), and the significance of an oral dispute for purposes of §
1692e(8) and § 1692h, falls flat. Indeed, the progressive revisions made to the
language of section 809 described above, substituting verification for "certification
of the validity of the debt" shows that section 809(a)(3), (4), and (b) were originally
drafted as a coherent whole, all turning on the significance of a dispute going to the
validity of a debt made in writing. By substituting the word verification for
"certication of the validity of the debt," the intent and meaning of the statute
became obscured. Compare 15 U.S.C. §1692g, 15 U.S.C. §1692e, and 15 U.S.C.
§1692h, with 15 U.S.C. § 1692p ("[Tihe alleged offender may dispute the validity.
of any alleged bad check violation .... ).
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sense to measure each type of verification response against the two
problems identified by the Senate Report those which section
1692g(b) was designed to eliminate - "dunning the wrong person or
attempting to collect debts which the consumer has already paid." 07
If either interpretation eliminates both of these problems, then that
interpretation should be preferred above the other. If both
interpretations are plausible, the one that best serves the broader aims
of the legislation - eliminating "abusive debt collection practices"
and insuring "that those debt collectors who refrain from using
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
disadvantaged,"os - should be favored. Lastly, the two
interpretations should be assessed against the Senate Report's
conclusion that debt collectors were already sending "similar
information to consumers," and verification would "not result in
additional expense or paperwork." 109
It would also make sense to consider the myriad reasons a
consumer might have to dispute (or dispute the "validity") of a given
debt, in that the obligation to provide verification only follows after a
written dispute is sent. Examples of legal disputes include any of the
reasons appearing as affirmative defenses in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c),110
or any of the grounds for excusing an obligation to pay for goods
identified in Article 2 of the UCC.' If disputed validity is also taken
to mean that a debt may be attacked for not being well-grounded and
supported by sufficient evidence, the breadth of "disputes" a
consumer might raise would be boundless, including objections for
hearsay, improper foundation, and best evidence. Beyond these
evidentiary contentions, disputed validity can be directed at a portion
of a given debt. Section 1692f(1) provides as a possible basis for a
dispute, "[tihe collection of any amount (including any interest, fee,
charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such
amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or
107 S. REP. No. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1699.
108 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)
'0 S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695,
1699 (emphasis added).
" See FED. R. CIv. P. 8 (listing the following affirmative defenses: accord and
satisfaction; arbitration and award; assumption of risk; contributory negligence;
duress; estoppel; failure of consideration; fraud; illegality; injury by fellow servant;
laches; license; payment; release; res judicata; statute of frauds; statute of
limitations; and waiver).
.' U.C.C. § 2-711 (2003).
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permitted by law."ll 2 A petty dispute over the validity of a penny or a
nickel of accrued interest is within the scope of potential disputes
going to a portion of the debt, just as .much as a dispute over
documentation of an assignment of the debt or assumption of liability
by a former spouse.
If disputes can be related to any of these possibilities, as well
as all generic 'disputes,' would it be fair to presume that Congress
intended to create a one-size-fits-all meaning for the obligation to
provide verification? If Congress so intended to create such a
meaning for the obligation to provide verification, it begs the
question: why would Congress mandate a singular or uniform
response from debt collectors that essentially ignores the substance of
consumer disputes directed to affirmative defenses, evidence, and
incidental parts of a debt? Conversely, would it make sense to require
a debt collector to affirmatively rebut an asserted affirmative defense,
proof deficiencies, and arguments going to incidental parts of a debt
before allowing collection to resume? Would it have been more
rational for Congress to insist that the sufficiency of a debt collector's
verification response must or should be measured in light of the
substance of the dispute raised? For example, if the consumer
disputes a portion of the debt, the addition of $1 to a $1,000 debt,
does section 1692g(b) limit the verification response requirement to
that portion of the disputed debt? If a consumer disputes the
applicable interest rate or the imposition of late fees on a defaulted
debt, should the verification response be read as requiring proof of
the validity of the applicable interest rate or late fees? Recalling the
purpose of verification was to eliminate only two recurring problems
and would not result in a certification of the validity of the debt from
the creditor, suggests that verification was not designed to address the
substance of any dispute.
Logically, it would seem that verification should involve an
investigation into whether there is either a valid basis for the amount
claimed by the debt collector to be due or a valid basis for the
consumer's specified dispute. Reading the verification requirement as
triggering a duty on the part of the debt collector to perform an
investigation and obtain and produce something going to the validity
of the debt or underlying facts in dispute before collection activity
resumes," 3 would be consistent with reading verification as "the
1n 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.
113 15 U.S.C. §1692g(a)(3) creates an assumption of validity, which is
overcome by the assertion of a dispute. A statutory assumption "does not require
the party invoking it to prove any fact, it operates against the party who normally
has the burden of proof, and if affects the burden of persuasion rather than the
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process of research, examination, etc. required to prove or establish
authenticity or validity."ll 4 However, numerous courts have rejected
the contention that the FDCPA imposes any obligation to conduct an
investigation concerning amounts placed for collection."' At the
same time, courts have found that pursuing collection for amounts
that were not validly owed subjects the debt collector to strict
liability. 16
burden of production." 21B Charles A. Wright, Kenneth W. Graham, Victor J.
Gold, Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5124 (2d ed.)
(construed as a "presumption," the assertion of a dispute would shift the burden of
production onto the debt collector). See, e.g., Nelson v. Select Financial Services,
Inc., 430 F.Supp.2d 455, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (observing the failure to dispute a
debt within thirty days "merely allows the debt collector to proceed under . . . a
'temporary fiction' that the debt stated in the validation notice is true."); Smith v.
Hecker, No. Civ. A. 04-5820, 2005 WL 894812, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2005)
(holding debt collector's statement that the debt will be 'assessed' as valid, violated
section 1692g). The notion that the legislation was intended to operate as a burden-
shifting mechanism is bolstered by H.R. 5294 § 804(e), titled "pleading and proof,"
which provided that:
In any action brought by a consumer against a debt collector under this
section, it shall be the duty of the consumer to plead both the existence
of a communication from the debt collector and the lack of consent of
the consumer thereto, and to make a prima facie showing that the
communication took place and that there was no such consent. ... Upon
such a prima facie showing, the burden of going forward shall be with
the debt collector.
114 RANDoM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1587 (1966).
11s Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1276 (11th Cir. 2011); Clark v.
Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2006)
(debt collector did not have duty to independently investigate validity of debt and
was entitled to rely on creditor's statements to verify debt); Jenkins v. Heintz, 124
F.3d 824, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1997) (collector qualified for "bona fide error" defense
where it had in place procedures to prevent violations of the FDCPA, and the
collector was not required to independently investigate and evaluate the validity of
forced placed insurance charges); Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025,
1032 (6th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the "bona fide error" defense does not require
a collector to conduct an independent investigation of the debt referred for
collection); McNall v. Credit Bureau of Josephine Cnty., 689 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1276 (D. Or. 2010); Sanchez v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d
1374, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2009); McCammon v. Bibler, Newman.& Reynolds, P.A.,
515 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D. Kan. 2007); Hulse v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 195
F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1210 (D. Or. 2002); Ducrest v. Alco Collections, Inc., 931 F.
Supp. 459, 462 (M.D. La. 1996); Hubbard v. Nat'l Bond and Collection Assocs,,
Inc., 126 B.R. 422, 428 (D. Del. 1991).
116 Compare Owen, 629 F.3d at 1270, with Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Assocs., Inc.,
211 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (N.D. Ill. 2002), af'd. in part, rev'd in part, 330 F.3d 991
(7th Cir. 2003). What emerges from these competing cases is at best a practical
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More to the point, an investigative reading of "verification"
does not make any practical sense because verification does not
"prove or establish authenticity or validity," 117 except perhaps in the
mind of the debt collector. Therefore, the core of a consumer dispute
in this -context, made in response to a demand for payment for an
unpaid debt, would logically involve an assertion by the consumer
that the demand for payment in a given amount set forth on the
validation notice was invalid for any number of reasons. However,
the FDCPA does not require a consumer to support a dispute with
any information, let alone require a quantum of evidence or
documentation to substantiate the dispute. The FDCPA is silent as to
whether a debt collector can communicate with the consumer to
obtain further information about the dispute and as to what effect
verification has on the debt or the dispute itself. Congress could have
provided that once verification is sent, it is entitled to some
deference, weight, or significance. Under section 1692g(c), however,
Congress provided that the failure to dispute is not to be construed by
courts as an admission of liability. It could also have provided that
once a dispute is raised and verification is provided, that
determination is entitled to some effect, estoppel, or weight by courts.
Further, Congress could have provided that once verification is
provided, a reciprocal burden of production is triggered on the part of
the consumer, or that the dispute must be resolved by a court of law
or arbitrator before further collection efforts are undertaken. Again,
the absence of any mention of the effects that stem from a debt's
verification supports the inference that verification proves and
establishes nothing and leaves disputes unresolved.
The verification requirement could also potentially be
interpreted as meaning that a "confirmation of the truth of a theory or
fact" would have no bearing on the consumer's dispute, except in the
case of an error, either in the amount of the debt or the identity of the
consumer. 118 Since the only effect of providing verification set forth
in the statute is that once provided, collection efforts can resume, it
might be sensible to read the verification requirement as having its
primary intended effect on a double-checking mechanism to
suggestion that to avoid liability, it would behoove the debt collector to look before
it leaps. In other words, while Congress may not have mandated any sort of
investigation to occur, if a dispute has been raised and no investigation has
occurred regarding a valid defense to repayment or address the subject of the
consumer's dispute, the debt collector proceeding with collection without
conducting a responsive investigation proceeds at its peril.
"
7 RANDOM HouSE DICTIONARY 1587 (1966).
... See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.10.
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eliminate persistent collection efforts that occurred as a result of an
error. The debt collector would only be required to confirm that the
amount sought from the consumer, and the identity of the consumer,
were correct.
As the testimony offered in the House Hearing showed, debt
collectors in the 1970s sent a first letter at the outset, which included
instruction to the consumer to notify the debt collector in the case of
a mistaken address or other error. Therefore, a confirmation of facts
interpretation has more underlying support than the investigation
interpretation.
As to a debt alleged to have already been paid, the amount
outstanding and the amount of payments are verifiable facts; the
information necessary to determine whether any given debt had
already been paid would require an assessment of an amount owed
and an amount paid, along with the relevant dates." 9 The possible
sources of information containing a record relating to amounts owed
and amounts paid, along with relevant dates, could derive from any
one of five sources: the creditor's account (or a subsequent owner of
the account) record, the debtor's (or the payee's) records, the debtor's
or creditor's bank's records, the credit reporting agency record, or the
debt collector's record. -
Consider, for instance, Debt Collector C, tasked to recover a
$1,000 debt on behalf of Creditor A, alleged to be owed as of January
1, 2011, from Debtor B. A and C agree that they will remain in daily
electronic communication concerning balance updates to reflect any
payments made directly to either A or C after placement of debts for
collection. On February 1, C sends a validation notice to B setting
forth the information required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), asserting that
B owes $1,000 to A. On February 15, A sends C a record of payment
made by B relating to the debt and recording a $1,000 payment made
on January 25. On March 1, B sends a written dispute to C asserting
that on January 25, 2011, $1,000 was paid to A regarding this debt.
If verification is read as requiring the debt collector to obtain
"confirmation of the truth of [the amount allegedly owed]" from the
available sources of information concerning this payment, C could
substantiate the fact of payment and the current amount owed from
its own records, B's records, A's records, bank records, or credit
reporting agency records. In any case, C will be unable to obtain
" See generally Litton Loan Servicing, LP, v. Garvida, 347 B.R. 697,
705 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (holding that payors have a burden to show that
they paid, and creditors have a burden to show that the payment -was not
complete).
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confirmation, evidence, or records that show A is still owed $1,000;
the verification process will show that B's assertion is true, and
therefore, C will.not be capable of obtaining verification of the debt,
and C's collection effort will cease. A wide-ranging investigation in
this context would serve no purpose.
Consider the same fact pattern, but assume that there was no
payment actually sent by B, received by A, or any information
communicated to C, any bank or credit reporting agency reflecting a
post-placement payment. On receipt of B's dispute, asserting "I
already paid," there are no records of payment in A, B, or C's
records, nor anywhere else. If verification is understood as a
requirement to confirm the truth or falsity of B's assertion of
payment, as opposed to the amount alleged to be owed, C would be
required- to prove the negative of B's assertion, such as by an
exhaustive review of all records of payment. At the conclusion of
such an investigation, C would have found no record substantiating
B's assertion and could only prove the absence of Payment as
provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence section 803(7). 20
Courts routinely allow proof of the absence of a record that
would ordinarily be recorded to give rise to a legitimate negative
inference that the event did not occur.121 In that B has not in fact
already paid the debt, the investigation reading would not allow for
"verification" to be obtained and collection to resume unless C sends
records of confirmation that the payment did not occur as alleged. If
all available sources of information have to be consulted to research
or investigate the claim of payment, sending C all records of payment
on the account does little to further the purposes of the statute and,
contrary to the Senate Report, would "result in additional expense ...
[and] paperwork." Interpreting verification to require confirmation,
on the other hand, would permit the debt collector to send
"confirmation" of the amount owed, thereby implicitly rejecting the
contention of payment, without requiring C to perform an exhaustive
search of the records, production of records showing the date and
amount of last payment was X, and a concluding attestation that no
record of the purported payment was found. Thus, this confirmation
of facts interpretation is consistent with the notion that verification is
12 0 FED. R. EvID. 803(7).
1' U.S. v. Harris, 557 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Robinson, 544 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Zeidman, 540 F.2d
314, 319 (7th Cir. 1976) (testimony regarding record search made by corporation's
accounts manager and as to the finding of certain checks from defendants but the
failure to find specific check allegedly sent from defendants was admissible in mail
fraud prosecution.).
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not synonymous with documentation.
Again, consider the same fact pattern, but assume that there
was a payment actually sent by B, received by A, but unwittingly
misapplied to another account by A in error, or sent with a "paid in
full" notation that went unnoticed 22 months before placement for
collection, and no information communicated to C reflecting the
payment. In the absence of a copy of the canceled check, the
assertion "I already paid" would not lead to a different outcome than
the prior scenario, under either the confirmation or investigation
reading. An investigation would yield nothing because there are no
facts suggesting an error occurred; and a confirmatory statement will
not result in a cessation of collection. However, if we assume B sends
C a copy of the payment showing A received and deposited the
payment, both the confirmation of facts and investigation reading
could each lead to a cessation of collection, so long as C understands
the significance of the "paid in full" notation or C observes a
discrepancy in the date and amount of last payment. Assuming that A
corroborates B's payment, no verification would be forthcoming, and
collection efforts would thereby cease.
As to whether the debt collector has targeted the "wrong
person," the identity of the person obligated on a debt is likewise a
verifiable fact,123 such that there is no real difference between the
confirmation and investigation interpretations of the word
verification. In all extensions of credit, the indentifying information
acquired by a creditor concerning a debtor would include, at- a
minimum, the debtor's full name, social security number, date of
birth, address, and driver's license number.124 A comparison between
122 See, e.g., Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Perz, 947 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ohio Ct. App.
2010).
123 Numerous federal regulations refer to "verification" as a process used to
confirm the identity of a person by comparing an asserted fact against other
sources, or as method for determining whether a given fact is true or false. See, e.g.,
6 C.F.R. § 37.13 (2011) (real ID driver's licenses and identification cards;
document verification requirements); 7 C.F.R. § 245.6a (2011) (child nutrition
programs); 7 C.F.R. § 272.8 (2011) (food stamps); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (2011)
(immigration); 10 C.F.R. § 9.54 (2011) (nuclear regulatory commission); 21 C.F.R.
§ 21.44 (2011) (FDA); 21 C.F.R. § 1314.105 (2011) (DEA); 24 C.F.R. § 5.216
(HUD); 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.910, 435.920 (2011) (Medicaid); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1120
(2011) (FCC); 48 C.F.R. 52.204-9 (2011) (acquisitions); 49 C.F.R. § 802.7 (2011)
(NTSB).
124 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2)(i)(A) (2011) (originally 31 C.F.R § 103.121).
As part of the customer verification process, the bank is required to obtain
verification of the identity of the customer either by examination of an "unexpired
government-issued identification evidencing nationality or residence and bearing a
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the data of the creditor and the data of the debtor would yield
information that would permit the debt collector to confirm the
identity of the right person as distinguished from the wrong person. If
the debtor asserts that she is the wrong person, the debt collector
would have to obtain her full name, social security number, date of
birth, and address, so as to permit a comparison of the same data in
the creditor's records, or at a minimum, provide the debtor with the
data in its files which identifies the right person, so as to permit the
debtor to corroborate that she is the right person. Whether the data
was originally collected as part of a written credit application,
online/electronic application, phone application, or interview, the
debt collector must presume the data in the creditor's file, which it
assumedly has been provided, is an accurate measure of comparison
against the debtor's data. Should the debtor supply the debt collector
with information establishing that she is the wrong person,
verification of the identity of the consumer would not be available,
and collection efforts would cease. Conversely, should the data
supplied to the debt collector by the debtor establish that she is the
right person, verification of the identity of the consumer would be
available and, once obtained and mailed to the consumer, collection
efforts could resume.12 5
photograph or similar safeguard, such as a driver's license or passport," or
"comparison of information provided by the customer with information obtained
from a consumer reporting agency, public database, or other source; checking
references with other financial institutions, and obtaining a financial statement." 31
C.F.R. § 1020.220(a)(2)(ii) (2011).
125 In instances where the debtor's identity was stolen and used to open the
account, as it pertains to disputes of fraud or identity theft, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(g),
part of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, provides in relevant
part:
If a person acting as a debt collector . . . on behalf of a third party that
is a creditor or other user of a consumer report is notified that any
information relating to a debt that the person is attempting to collect
may be fraudulent or may be the result of identity theft, that person
shall-
(1) notify the third party that the information may be fraudulent
or may be the result of identity theft; and
(2) upon request of the consumer to whom the debt purportedly
relates, provide to the consumer all information to which the
consumer would otherwise be entitled if the consumer were not a
victim of identity theft, but wished to dispute the debt under
provisions of law applicable to that person.
15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2011). Thus, where the "dispute" relates to a claim of
fraud or identity theft, the verification response requirement under the FCRA
is no greater than under the FDCPA.
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In the context of other disputes, the confirmation of facts
reading would limit the scope of the debt collector's obligation to
meet the dispute with a broad investigatory duty. Consider the debtor
that ordered a brown coat from a web merchant and paid with his
credit card. When the coat arrived in the mail, the shade of brown is
lighter than depicted on the website; rather than being the burnt
umber shape of brown that the debtor desired, the coat appeared to be
bronze. Instead of returning the coat, the consumer keeps it, but when
the credit card bill comes, the consumer decides he does not have to
pay because he believes that he has been the subject of a bait and
switch. When the debt collector contacts him, he responds to the
validation notice by sending a written dispute of the debt and
demanding verification, all the while wearing his brown coat.
Assuming the consumer explains the basis for the dispute,126 it would
be absurd to impose a duty to investigate what shade of brown was
depicted on the merchant's website and compare that to the shade of
brown of the coat sent, collecting information relating to the date,
time and manner of purchase, confirmation of shipping and receipt of
the merchandise, along with a copy of the payment record. The
consumer has offered no basis for contesting the demand for payment
nor identified a valid defense. In such a case, the confirmation of
facts reading supports the conclusion that "verification of a debt
involves nothing more than the debt collector confirming in writing
that the amount being demanded is what the creditor is claiming is
owed . . . . There is no concomitant obligation to forward copies of
bills or other detailed evidence of the debt." 27
Consider the same hypothetical, but assume the coat never
arrived and the consumer made a good faith attempt to resolve the
issue with the merchant, but when the bill arrived, the consumer
neglected to dispute it in a timely fashion with the card issuer.128 In a
126 Under the FCBA, a consumer is required to "set[ ] forth the reasons for the
obligor's belief (to the extent applicable) that the statement contains a billing
error." 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (emphasis added). Failure to set forth those reasons
relieves the creditor from the need to respond with an investigation. Millan v.
Chase Bank USA, N.A, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2008). But even if
the reasons advanced amount to nit-picking or are not made in good faith, the
creditor's failure to follow the statutory procedures still gives rise to a violation.
Kurz v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 273 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
127 Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394,406 (4th Cir. 1999).
128 See 15 U.S.C. § 1666(a) (providing 60 days to dispute for nondelivery); 15
U.S.C. 1666(a)(3)(B)(ii) ("[A] creditor may not construe such amount to be
correctly shown unless he determines that such goods were actually delivered,
mailed, or otherwise sent to the obligor and provides the obligor with a statement of
such determination."); see also Dawkins v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 109 F.3d 241,
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court of law, this set of facts would defeat the. creditor's right of
recovery because it goes to the core of the demand for payment and
casts the validity of the debt in doubt.129 If the verification response
imposes an obligation to investigate the facts of delivery of the
merchandise from the original creditor to the consumer, it would
involve a "determin[ation] that such goods were actually delivered,
mailed, or otherwise sent to the obligor and provid[ing] the obligor
with a statement of such determination."'3o A duty of investigation
would impose an obligation- on the credit card lender to make the
delivery determination, essentially giving the consumer an
opportunity to raise a FCBA dispute with creditors until the debt is
repaid or the statute of limitation on the debt expires. Aside from the
obvious temporal disruption such a reading would cause under the
FCBA,13 1 the FDCPA prohibits the debt collector from
communicating with the merchant seller,132 thereby undermining, if
not dooming, the investigation reading.
Consider further a dispute concerning services rendered. The
creditor rendering the services claims it is owed X. The consumer
disputes the validity of the debt and requests verification because she
believes the reasonable value of services rendered is not X, but Y. If
verification was intended to require the debt collector to conduct an
investigation into the value of services rendered, as opposed to
obtaining confirmation of the amount the creditor is claiming as due,
what would such an investigation consist of and to what end?
Suppose that the debt collector was permitted to and retained an
expert in the field who formed the opinion that the reasonable value
of the services was in fact X, not Y. Would the consumer not do the
same? Whatever verification entails, it would resolve nothing. The
consumer still believes Y is owed, not X, and the creditor still
believes X is owed, not Y; the debt is still in dispute. If the debt
collector confirms "in writing that the amount being demanded is
what the creditor is claiming is owed," and then continues collection
efforts, the debt collector, the creditor, and the consumer are each left
in their respective corners, leaving their dispute intact and unresolved
243 (5th Cir. 1997) (failure to timely dispute does not impose a duty to investigate).
129 See generally 15 U.S.C. §1666(b)(3); Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Mincks, 135
S.W.3d 545, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
Is0 15 U.S.C. §1666(a)(3)(B)(ii).
"3' See Millan, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 1066; Am. Express Co. v. Koerner, 452 U.S.
233, 236-37 (1981); see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(h) (2011) (holding that a
creditor's resolution of a prior billing dispute relieves the creditor of any obligation
to reinvestigate substantially the same billing error).
132 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
1952011]
Loyola Consumer Law Review
for another day and for resolution in another forum. That is ultimately
how Congress expected the verification response requirement to
function - that the verification requirement would only eliminate
inadvertent errors in billing the wrong person or the wrong amount.
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of the FDCPA shows that verification
was substituted for obtaining a certification of validity from the
creditor so as to omit any implication that the statute required the
debt collector to obtain evidence, documentation, or an attestation
from the creditor. Between the two arguable interpretations,
interpreting verification as requiring a written confirmation of the
amount owed and the identity of the consumer alone is consistent
with the Senate Report, the practices in use by debt collectors in the
mid-1970s, the framework established under the FCBA, restrictions
on communications under the FDCPA, as well as the confirmation
view espoused in Rudek. Interpreting verification to require an
investigation into the dispute serves no purpose, is inconsistent with
the Senate Report, and imposes additional expense and paperwork. It
is also inconsistent with restrictions on communications under the
FDCPA and undermines the dispute resolution framework
established under the FCBA.
Reduced to its essence, verification was intended only to
serve as a double-checking mechanism. It was meant to ensure that
collection efforts were promptly terminated when resulting from
inadvertent errors. The verification response must consist of a written
statement sent to the consumer confirming the correct amount owed
and identifying who owes it. In this way, the legislation "does not
attempt to insulate the consumer debtbr against the unpleasantness of
a reminder that he has not lived up to his word to pay a just debt[,] . .
. and gives full recognition to the important role .. . an ethical debt
collector plays in our credit-oriented society."' 33
m Hearings on S. 656, S. 918, S. 1130, and H.R. 5294 Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. at 44.
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